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Ten  states  and  the  District  of  Columbia  prohibit  payday  loan  stores,
and  thirty-one  other  states  have  imposed  regulatory  restraints  on
their  operations,  ranging  from  limits  on fees  and  loan  amounts  to
the  number  of  rollovers  and  renewals  allowed  a  borrower.  Given
the  importance  of payday  lenders  to  signiﬁcant  segments  of the
population  and  the  wide  variation  among  state  regulatory  regimes,
our  paper  examines  the  extent  to  which  the  concentration  of  pay-
day  lenders  in  counties  throughout  the  country  is  related  to the
regulatory  environment  as  well  as to  various  ﬁnancial  and  demo-
graphic  factors.  The  analysis  is  based  on  a unique  dataset  that  has
been  obtained  directly  from  each  state’s  appropriate  regulatory
authority.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Inc.  This  is an  open
access  article  under  the  CC  BY  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Payday loans are among the easiest small loans to obtain. A borrower typically needs only a check-
ing account and documentation of a steady source of income, either from a job or other veriﬁable
source. The loans are extremely short term, typically structured with a due date that coincides with
the borrower’s next payday, usually within two weeks. A borrower provides the lender, known as
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a payday lender,1 with either a postdated personal check for the loan amount and lending fee, or
the authorization to electronically debit the checking account for the amount due. When the loan is
due, the lender deposits the personal check or initiates an electronic withdrawal from the borrower’s
checking account.
Payday loans differ from bank loans because the borrower is charged a single ﬂat fee, such as $15
per $100 borrowed, rather than recurring interest payments. This practice is allowed even though the
ﬂat fees, when converted to interest rates, almost always exceed state usury rates. For this reason
and others, however, the payday lending industry has generated much debate, especially in recent
years, over its practices and customer base. Amid allegations that payday loans are not only usurious
but predatory, payday lenders face varying operational restrictions in states, even being prohibited in
some of them.
The controversy over payday lenders centers on the fees they charge and their typical customer
base. Consider the fees on payday loans in the following two states. In Indiana the allowable fee
of $15 for a $100 loan on a fourteen-day payday loan is equivalent to an annual percentage rate of
390 percent. However, in Missouri the allowable fee of $75 for the same size loan translates into an
annual percentage rate of 1950 percent.2 Certain consumer organizations, advocacy groups, and state
attorneys general consider such high interest rates to be outrageous and downright inappropriate, a
factor no doubt in the decision by some state governments either to ban payday lending stores or to
impose much lower interest rate caps on their loans. In addition, payday lenders are often subjected
to accusations that they engage in predatory lending by locating their stores in areas with higher
concentrations of low-income individuals, who are unemployed, less educated, and disproportionately
African American and Hispanic. Indeed, Ohio Senator Sherrod Brown voiced the concern during a 2014
hearing of the Senate Banking Committee “that payday companies are marketing their high-cost loans
to the very people who can least afford them, much like predatory mortgage lenders did in the run up
to the housing crisis.”3
Our paper examines the relationship between the different regulatory restrictions imposed on
payday lenders and the concentration of their stores throughout the United States. The examination
is based on both county- and state-level data. The latter data enables us to capture differences in the
regulatory environment that constrains the prices and other aspects of the loan products that payday
lenders may  offer. The county-level data when combined with the state-level data enable us to conduct
an empirical analysis to determine the extent to which the numbers of payday loan stores correlates to
state regulatory restrictions, as well as to the various demographic and economic characteristics of the
neighborhoods in which they are located.4 Based on a new and unique dataset obtained directly from
each state regulatory authority, we ﬁnd that payday lenders operate more stores in those counties
located in states whose regulatory regimes are more lenient.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a selective literature review.
This is followed by an overview of the payday lending industry. Section 4 discusses the problem of
obtaining data on the operation of payday lending ﬁrms throughout the nation and information on
1 Payday lenders are also referred to as deferred deposit originators, and their product as payday advances, cash advances,
deferred deposits, among other terms. While overdraft credit provided by banks is related to payday credit, Morgan et al. (2012)
report that payday loans are typically cheaper than covered overdrafts.
2 The interest rates in both cases are calculated assuming that both loans are outstanding for a year and the fees are paid
every fourteen days. Of course, the rates are much higher if one assumes a new loan is taken out every fourteen days and the
same fees are charged.
3 See Douglas (2014, p. 2).
4 Due to limited availability of data, the paper focuses on actual storefronts to the exclusion of online payday lenders. However,
William H. Sorrell (2014, p. 1), attorney general of Vermont, recently stated that “Online lenders nationwide (currently numbered
at  over 200) earned over $18 billion dollars in income from high-interest, small-dollar loans made in 2012.” Yet, according to
the  CFPB (2013), these online payday loans still make up a minority of the total loan volume, and the loans are offered with
fees  equal to or higher than storefront loans. In Appendix 1 we  provide information on both in-state and online payday lenders.
As  the appendix shows, online payday lenders only account for 6.2 percent of all payday lenders. It should be noted that in
the  late 1990s some payday lenders began partnering with nationally chartered banks and that payday loans became “bank
loans” because such banks were not subject to state-imposed fee caps or usury laws. However, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation took actions in 2003 and 2005 that, according to Stegman (2007, p. 179), “rendered the rent-a-bank model obsolete.”
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the regulations governing their operations as well as our approach to overcoming this problem. Sec-
tion 5 presents and discusses our model and empirical results relating to the regulatory and other
determinants of the location and concentration of payday lending stores in counties across the coun-
try. Section 6 summarizes our results and suggests future research possibilities to better understand
whether there are net social beneﬁts to the payday lending industry.
2. Selective literature review
The conclusions that are reached in much of the existing literature on payday lending reinforce
the view that the industry is indeed predatory because it targets economically vulnerable and less-
educated individuals. To a far lesser degree, some studies reach the conclusion that there are actual
beneﬁts associated with payday lending, such as fewer bounced checks and their associated fees, and
fewer bankruptcy ﬁlings.
In a relatively early study, Stegman and Faris (2003) analyzed a database of 142 (165) payday lenders
operating 807 (902) outlets for the year 1999 (2000) in North Carolina. Their data showed that over
the two-year period there were double-digit increases in the number and value of deferred deposit
checks, as well as the payday loan fees collected. Net charge-offs increased by 54 percent, reﬂecting
the higher risk of such loans. Their results indicate that lower-income African Americans were more
than twice as likely as white non-Hispanics to have taken out a payday loan. Of interest, they found
that Hispanics were less likely than other groups to utilize payday loans. Older individuals were also
less likely turn to payday lenders than were younger individuals. Furthermore, the results indicate that
the number of banks and thrifts in a household’s neighborhood had a small but signiﬁcantly negative
effect on the use of payday lenders.
Morgan and Strain (2008) performed an examination of payday lending focusing on Georgia and
North Carolina, two states that banned such loans in 2004 and 2005, respectively. Based on an analysis
of data for returned checks at Federal Reserve processing centers from 1997 to 2007, complaints ﬁled
with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) between 1997 and 2007, and bankruptcy ﬁllings between
1998 and 2007, they found that households in Georgia bounced more checks, complained more to the
FTC about lenders and debt collectors, and ﬁled for bankruptcy protection at a higher rate than did
households in states that permitted payday lending. They also found that North Carolina households
fared about the same as those in Georgia. In a related nationwide study, Morgan, Strain, and Seblani
(2012) examined the period between 1998 and 2008, ﬁnding some evidence that while bankruptcy
rates decrease after payday loan bans, complaints against lenders tend to increase. Moreover, the
authors report that their most robust ﬁnding is that returned check numbers and overdraft fee income
at depository institutions increase after payday lending bans.5
In a more geographically limited study, Gallmeyer and Roberts (2009) conduct a study of pay-
day lenders in the Front Range area (the populous eastern foothills of the Rockies) of Colorado. They
perform an analysis of the sociodemographic characteristics of those communities, as measured by
median household income, percentage of the population falling substantially below the federal poverty
line, and the labor force composition. The authors ﬁnd that payday lenders are more likely to con-
centrate their stores in neighborhoods with lower income and moderate poverty, and with higher
percentages of ethnic minorities, immigrants, young adults, the elderly, military personnel, and those
working in non-management/non-professional occupations.
In a study limited to Oregon and Washington, Zinman (2010) uses data from two  2007 telephone
surveys of 1040 payday borrowers to examine some of the effects of restricting access to expensive
credit. Oregon imposed a binding rate cap on payday loans that year, whereas Washington did not.
Zinman ﬁnds that access to payday loans declined in Oregon relative to Washington, suggesting that
many borrowers in Oregon shifted into plausibly inferior substitutes, such as bounced checks. In a
5 Changes in credit supply are proxied by two  dummy  variables, with 0 representing both before a state banned payday
lending and also before a state passed enabling legislation for payday lending, and 1 in both cases after the banning and
enabling changes took place. The authors rely on annual store counts obtained from Stephens Inc., an investment bank that
tracks  the payday lending industry.
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related and more recent study, Carrell and Zinman (2014) analyze the impact of payday loan access on
three different measures of military job performance in thirty-ﬁve states that either allow or prohibit
payday lending for the period 1995–2007. Their empirical results indicate that payday loan access
adversely affects overall job performance, retention, and readiness.
Combining household survey data and county-level data for thirteen states, three of which prohibit
payday lending, Melzer (2011) examines whether payday loan access mitigates ﬁnancial distress, as
some supporters of the industry claim. His results indicate that access to payday lending leads instead
to increased difﬁculty paying mortgage, rent, and utilities bills, and to delays in needed health care.
Morse (2011) also examines whether payday lending exacerbates or mitigates ﬁnancial distress.
Speciﬁcally, she considers whether the adverse effects of natural disasters on home foreclosures and
small property crimes are mitigated when individuals are able to utilize payday lenders. Her analysis
is based on data for California payday lenders at the ZIP code level over the period 1996–2002. In
contrast to Melzer, however, she ﬁnds that payday lenders provide a beneﬁcial service to individuals
facing unexpected ﬁnancial distress.
In another paper, Bertrand and Morse (2011, p. 1889), in a study based on a survey of 100 stores of a
large national payday lending chain over the period May  to September 2008, conclude that “. . .getting
consumers to think more long term about the adding up of the dollar costs over time, putting the loan
in the context of comparative products to increase its evaluability, and, to a lesser degree, disclosing
information on the typical proﬁle of payday loan reﬁnancing signiﬁcantly reduces the frequency and
amount of payday borrowing”. Bhutta (2014), on the other hand, uses ZIP code data to analyze the
socioeconomic factors correlated with concentrations of payday lenders. Unlike the two  studies that
ﬁnd, respectively, negative and positive effects of payday loans on ﬁnancial well-being, his empirical
results indicate little connection in terms of such loans and credit scores, new delinquencies, or the
likelihood of overdrawing credit lines.
Quite recently the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), established by the Dodd–Frank
Act in 2010, has devoted attention to payday lending. Two white papers were issued focusing on
the long-term use of short-term loans, as evidenced by a pattern of repeatedly rolling over, i.e., re-
borrowing (2013; Burke, Lanning, Leary, & Wang, 2014). In the 2013 paper, the CFPB ﬁnds that the
median amount borrowed was $350, with about a third of borrowers having six loans or less and a
total dollar amount borrowed of $1500 during a year-long period. In the 2014 paper, using the same
data as in the 2013 study, which includes information on over 12 million loans in 30 states, the CFPB
found that approximately 80 percent of loans are renewed with another loan within fourteen days.
3. Overview of the payday lending industry
In this and other studies of payday lenders, two  important issues arise. First, one must identify in
which states payday lenders can legally operate, and the regulatory environment of those states that
do permit them.6 Appendix 1 indicates that ten states and the District of Columbia prohibit payday
lenders. The states are Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Vermont, and West Virginia, as shown in Fig. 1.
Four states—Connecticut, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon—set maximum payday loan rates
based on a ﬁnance charge for a fourteen-day $100 loan that are far below the typical payday lender rates
and are clearly intended to deter the operation of payday lenders within their borders. The rates are as
follows: Connecticut, 30 percent; Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon, each 36 percent. At the other
end of the spectrum, six states—Delaware, Idaho, Nevada, South Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin—set no
limits on the rates that may  be charged for payday loans. In short, the sky’s the limit. Thirty of the
remaining states that permit payday lending explicitly specify that triple-digit rates may  be charged
(see Appendix 2 for this list). And Missouri speciﬁes the highest maximum interest rate that may  be
charged at 1950 percent.7 Fig. 2 shows the fairly wide distribution of interest rates that payday lenders
6 To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst time such regulatory information has been collected and used in a study of the payday
lending industry.
7 As a result of the Talent-Nelson Amendment to the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act of 2007, a 36 percent
annual  percentage rate cap took effect on October 1, 2007, for all payday loans made to active-duty military borrowers.
18 J.R. Barth et al. / Journal of Economics and Business 84 (2016) 14–29
Fig. 1. States that prohibit payday lending.
Fig. 2. Distribution of maximum allowable interest rates by payday lenders.
may  charge in states, excluding the ten states in which payday lending is prohibited and two states
for which no information about the APR is available.
Appendix 2 includes other important information about the regulatory constraints imposed on the
payday lending industry. There are, for example, limits on the loan amount in all but four states: Maine,
Texas, Utah, and Wyoming. The lowest allowable maximum loan amount is $300, in both California
and Montana (no payday lenders are known to be operating in Montana), while the highest allowable
maximum loan amount is $50,000, in Oregon. The most frequent maximum loan amount allowed is
$500, found in eighteen states.8
In addition to limits placed on the loan amount, all but nine states specify upper limits on the terms
on these loans. Nineteen states have no speciﬁed minimum loan terms. Seventeen states specify a
8 Two states, Nevada and New Mexico limit the maximum loan amount to 25% of monthly gross income.
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maximum loan term, but not a minimum. Of these states, Illinois speciﬁes the longest allowable loan
term, at 120 days, whereas Florida, Kansas, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Texas specify the shortest
allowable loan term, at seven days. The most frequent maximum loan term is thirty-one days. Of note,
Colorado speciﬁes a minimum loan term of six months.
Regulations also specify the number of loans an individual may  have outstanding at one time, and
the number of times a loan may  be rolled over. Eight states—Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Nevada, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming—either do not specify or do not set a limit on the number
of outstanding loans. Alabama does not limit the number of outstanding loans but instead limits the
dollar amount outstanding at any one time. Most states limit simultaneous outstanding loans to one
or two.
Twenty-four states prohibit rollovers altogether. Ten states, again listed in Appendix 2, allow
between one and four rollovers, while Kansas, Maine, and Pennsylvania do not specify a limit. The
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ﬁnds that over 80 percent of payday loans are rolled over or
followed by another loan within fourteen days (2014, p. 4).
The second issue that arises in studies of payday lenders involves determining the number of ﬁrms
operating in the different states. Unfortunately, no central database exists for such information, nor is
such information readily available from the various state regulatory authorities. One source of informa-
tion on the number of payday lenders is Stephens Inc. (2013), which estimates that there were 18,273
payday lending stores in 2012. Another source of information to identify payday lending ﬁrms is the
North American Industrial Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) codes. Speciﬁcally, the codes include (1) ﬁrms
primarily engaged in making unsecured cash loans to consumers and (2) those that facilitate credit
intermediation, including check cashing services and money order issuance services.9 These ﬁrms
encompass non-depository consumer lending and other activities related to credit intermediation.
It should be noted that a few fairly large ﬁrms, play a major role in the industry. Advance America,
the largest such ﬁrm in the United States, was acquired in 2012 by Grupo Elektra, a corporation owned
by Ricardo Salinas Pliego of Mexico. Advance America has roughly 2400 stores throughout the United
States. However, these are not exclusively payday lenders; some of the stores are pawnbrokers or offer
check cashing and other services.
As of mid-2014, we were only able to identify the following ﬁrms as publicly traded entities: Cash
America International (CSH), QC Holdings (QCCO), EZCORP Inc. (EXPW), First Cash Financial Services
(FCFS), and DFC Global (DLLR). All these ﬁrms engage not only in payday lending but offer other short-
term ﬁnancial services, such as pawn lending and check cashing. Cash America International has more
than 1000 stores; QC Holdings has about 500 outlets, while EZCORP Inc. has about 900 US outlets, with
roughly 500 being ﬁnancial service stores. DFC Global operates in a number of countries, with about
293 outlets in the United States. And First Cash Financial has 309 U.S. stores and others in Mexico.
4. New and unique dataset on payday lenders
As we noted above, studies focusing on the number of payday lending stores usually rely on esti-
mates or a proxy measure for such ﬁrms. Appendix 1 reports the number of payday lenders for each
state based on the NAICS codes, which was the source of information used by Bhutta (2014).10 The
total for all the states is 29,044. We  concluded, however, that the most reliable information on the
number and location of payday lending stores as well as the regulatory restrictions under which they
operate could only be obtained from state regulatory authorities. We  therefore contacted every state
regulatory authority, requesting information on the number of payday lenders as well as the speciﬁc
regulations governing operations in that state. As also seen in Appendix 1, based on this information
from the regulatory authorities, the number for all states drops to 16,814, for a difference of 12,230.
This means that using a proxy measure, such as the NAICS data, overstates the ofﬁcial number of such
lenders by more than 12,000 ﬁrms, or 73 percent. For those states that prohibit payday lending, the
proxy measure includes 3636 ﬁrms—even though the actual number of payday lenders is zero.
9 The codes are 522291 (consumer lending) and 522390 (other activities related to credit intermediation). Barth et al. (2015)
follow Bhutta (2014) and therefore also rely on the two NAICS codes.
10 Numbers are included, even for the ten states and the District of Columbia that prohibit payday lending.
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Fig. 3. Number of in-state payday lenders by state.
Fig. 3 illustrates the distribution of in-state payday lenders by state. The greatest numbers are found
in California, Tennessee and Texas, with each state having more than 1000 payday lending stores. Texas
leads the list, with 3889, while Maine has the fewest, just eleven. Appendix 3 also provides the mean
number—6.32—of payday lenders in the 2531 counties where they legally operate, with the minimum
number being 0 (which occurs in 1065 counties) and the maximum number being 734 (which occurs
in Harris county, Texas).
Fig. 4 shows the number of payday lenders per 10,000 people for each state. Mississippi has the
highest number of payday lending stores on this basis, followed by South Dakota, Alabama, Tennessee,
Fig. 4. Number of in-state payday lenders per 10,000 people.
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Texas, Missouri, Delaware, Kentucky, and Kansas, which all have more than one store per 10,000
people. Several states have no payday lenders per 10,000 people. These include states that prohibit
payday lending, as well as states that impose quite low interest rates, such as Connecticut, Montana,
and New Hampshire.
5. Empirical model and results
To address the issue of the concentration of payday lending stores per 10,000 people in counties,
we specify the following model:
yi = ˛i + ˇ1(regulatory restrictions)i + ˇ2(ﬁnancial factors)i
+ ˇ3(demographic factors)i + ˇ4(educational factors)i + εi, (1)
where yi is the number of payday lending stores per 10,000 people; regulatory restrictions are various
state limitations on the operations of payday lenders (to our knowledge these important variables
have been excluded in previous studies); ﬁnancial factors include income per capita, the poverty rate,
and the unemployment rate; demographic factors include the percentages of the population that are
African American, Asian, Hispanic, age 15 and under, and age 65-plus; educational factors include
the percentages of the population that have a high school degree or higher and a bachelor’s degree
or higher; εi is a random error term: and i indexes the 2531 counties in our sample.11 Appendices 1
and 2 provide the information on the model’s dependent and regulatory restriction variables, while
Appendix 3 provides descriptive statistics for the same and other explanatory variables separately for
all counties, including those counties allowing payday lenders and those counties prohibiting payday
lenders.
Appendix 4 provides the simple correlations among the various variables used in our analysis. In
this table, given the substantial variation in population among the different counties, as already noted,
the focus is on the number of payday lending stores per 10,000 people. Perhaps not surprisingly, the
number of payday lending stores is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with the percentages of
the population that are African American and age 15 and under (indicating a larger family size). The
correlations between the number of payday lending stores and the percentages of the population
that are white, Hispanic, Asian, and age over 65 are signiﬁcantly negative. We also ﬁnd that the cor-
relations between the number of payday lending stores and the percentages of the population that
have high school and bachelor’s degrees are signiﬁcantly negative, which also does not seem surpris-
ing. Also, there is a signiﬁcantly negative correlation between the number of payday lending stores
and metropolitan areas. In other words, there is a greater concentration of these stores in rural areas
undoubtedly due to the higher search and travel costs of obtaining loans from such ﬁrms.
Turning to the ﬁnancial factors, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative correlation between the number
of payday lending stores and income per capita, while a signiﬁcant and positive correlation exists
between the number of stores and the poverty rate and unemployment rate. At the same time, the
number of payday lending stores is signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with the maximum loan amount,
but positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with the remaining four regulatory restriction variables.
As an alternative to the individual restrictions, we  constructed a payday regulation index based on
the various regulatory restrictions, which is more fully described below. This index is positively and
signiﬁcantly related to the number of payday lending stores. Thus, in general, the number of stores is
positively correlated with the leniency of regulations, a ﬁnding not previously reported in the literature
due to the exclusion of information on the regulatory restrictions placed on payday lenders in those
states allowing such ﬁrms.
One ﬁnal correlation is between the number of payday lending stores and the extent to which a
county experiences natural disasters. The relationship between this variable, which is described below,
11 Our study is related to that of Prager (2009) and Barth et al. (2015), and several of the papers they discuss, but relies on
more recent and ofﬁcial regulatory data, a somewhat different set of variables to explain the concentration of payday lending
stores, and, most important, various restrictions on the operations of payday lenders in states.
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Table 1
OLS and Tobit regressions: Number of payday lenders per 10,000 people on selected demographic and ﬁnancial characteristics
in  counties for states that permit payday lending.
1a
OLS
1b
Tobit
2a
OLS
2b
Tobit
3a
OLS
3b
Tobit
4a
OLS
4b
Tobit
Constant 2.231 64.118 2.025 38.762 1.997 44.235 1.446 44.319
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)
Black  or African
American
0.014 0.176 0.014 0.121 0.014 0.150 0.013 0.115
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
Asian −0.011 −1.273 −0.010 −0.903 −0.012 −1.459 −0.003 −0.754
(0.193) (0.021) (0.220) (0.029) (0.142) (0.015) (0.756) (0.117)
Hispanic or Latino
origin
−0.009 −0.150 −0.009 −0.166 −0.009 −0.106 −0.012 −0.353
(0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.079) (0.000) (0.001)
Age  under 15 0.009 −0.274 0.010 −0.048 0.008 −0.274 0.017 −0.194
(0.230) (0.188) (0.173) (0.789) (0.272) (0.196) (0.029) (0.360)
Age  65-plus −0.022 −1.477 −0.022 −1.318 −0.022 −1.465 −0.022 −1.538
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
High  school degree or
higher
−0.023 −0.869 −0.023 −0.738 −0.022 −0.788 −0.021 −0.940
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Poverty rate 0.031 0.520 0.039 1.011 0.032 0.559 0.031 0.513
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Unemployment rate −0.006 −0.517 −0.006 −0.352 −0.006 −0.425 −0.005 −0.449
(0.304) (0.015) (0.357) (0.037) (0.375) (0.035) (0.436) (0.030)
APR*Poverty −0.001 −0.058
(0.047) (0.001)
APR-squared −0.002 −0.135
(0.135) (0.010)
Maximum dollar loan
amount
−0.009 −2.040 −0.006 −1.975 −0.006 −1.798
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.035) (0.004)
APR for fourteen-day
$100 Loan
0.011 0.493 0.027 1.423 0.045 3.574
(0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.001) (0.050) (0.006)
Maximum number of
outstanding loans
0.030 0.358 0.029 0.304 0.030 0.221
(0.014) (0.257) (0.018) (0.310) (0.013) (0.488)
Maximum number of
rollovers or renewals
0.066 1.779 0.069 2.082 0.071 0.244
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
Metropolitan area −0.082 −1.227
(0.072) (0.429)
Disasters 0.245 12.166
(0.000) (0.002)
Payday regulation
index
0.055 2.183
(0.000) (0.001)
Sigma  4.522
(0.000)
4.350
(0.000)
4.579
(0.000)
4.644
(0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.218 0.219 0.218 0.216
is found to be signiﬁcantly positive, indicating the greater the likelihood that counties are more prone
to experiencing ﬁnancial distress the greater the concentration of payday lenders.
Turning to the multivariate empirical results, the dependent variable employed is the number of
in-state payday lending stores per 10,000 people in a county, as shown in Table 1.12 The ordinary least
squares (OLS) results in 1a indicate that the percentage of the population that is African American is
positively and signiﬁcantly related to the number of payday lending stores.13 However, the coefﬁcient
on the percentage that is Hispanic is signiﬁcantly negative, a result that is consistent with Stegman and
12 We use only data for in-state payday lenders because we  cannot match online payday lenders to counties. As noted earlier,
these lenders play a relatively small role both in terms of numbers and loan amounts in the entire industry.
13 The variance inﬂation factors (VIFs) (not included) indicate there is no problem with multicollinearity among the variables.
However, due to multicollinearity between high school degree and bachelor’s degree as well as between the unemployment
rate  and income per capita only high school degree and unemployment rate are included in the regressions. The results are
unchanged when these two variables are replaced by bachelor’s degree and income per capita, respectively.
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Faris (2003). Family size is not signiﬁcant, but the percent of the population over age 65 is signiﬁcantly
negative.
The poverty rate enters with a signiﬁcantly positive sign, which one might expect. Also, as one
might expect, the percentage of the population with a high school degree or higher enters with a
signiﬁcantly negative sign. Furthermore, the coefﬁcient on the unemployment rate is not signiﬁcant.
With respect to the regulatory variables, the coefﬁcients on the maximum number of outstanding
loans, the APR and the maximum number of rollovers or renewals are all signiﬁcantly positive, while
the coefﬁcient on the maximum dollar loan amount is negative and signiﬁcant.
Regression 2a includes an interaction term between APR and poverty. The coefﬁcient is negative
and signiﬁcant, suggesting that a higher poverty rate lessens the positive impact of the APR.
To examine whether the concentration of payday lenders per capita is larger in urban areas versus
non-urban areas, we sort counties into metropolitan and nonmetropolitan using the classiﬁcation from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov). We  create a dummy  variable, metropolitan, that
takes a value of one if a county has a metropolitan area and zero otherwise. The results in 4a indicate
that metropolitan areas do indeed have a lower concentration of payday lenders per capita than
nonmetropolitan areas. This suggests that proximity is an important factor in the location of payday
lending stores. We  also include a nonlinear variable, APR-squared, in our regressions. As regression
3a shows, the coefﬁcient on the APR-squared term is not signiﬁcant.
To further examine the relationship between the regulatory environment and the concentration
of payday lending stores, we create a payday regulation index that is based on state payday lending
restrictions. Speciﬁcally, the index contains four restriction measures established by each state that
govern the payday lending industry: (1) maximum loan amount ($), (2) APR for fourteen day $100
loan, (3) maximum number of outstanding loans at one time, and (4) number of permitted rollovers.
For each measure, we divide all the observations into quartiles and assign a value of one to the ﬁrst
quartile, two to the second quartile and so forth. The payday regulation index is the sum of these four
components. A higher value of the index indicates a more lenient regulatory environment.
Regression 4a shows the results using this payday regulation index as an independent variable. The
coefﬁcient on the index is positive and signiﬁcant, indicating that the concentration of payday lenders
is greater in counties located in states with more lenient regulatory restrictions. This is a ﬁnding
unique to our study and is based on our new regulatory data obtained directly from state regulatory
authorities.
Payday lenders are often the last resort lenders to borrowers that face liquidity shocks. To proxy
for such shocks, we identify counties that were declared disaster areas by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) between 2010 and 2014 (http://www.fema.org). We  create a dummy
variable, Disasters, that takes a value of one if a county experienced a FEMA-declared disaster during
these ﬁve years. The results when this variable is included are shown in regression 4a. The coefﬁcient
on Disasters variable is positive and signiﬁcant, suggesting that disaster-prone areas are associated
with a higher concentration of payday lenders who are able to provide loans to ﬁnancially-distressed
individuals.
Because a fairly large number of observations for the dependent variable are clustered at zero,
the empirical model was re-estimated using a Tobit estimator as was  done, for example, in the study
by Bertrand and Morse (2011). In this case, as shown in Table 1, two main differences emerge in
the empirical results. All the signiﬁcant variables based upon the OLS results, with the exception of
metropolitan area, are similarly signiﬁcant when using the Tobit estimator. However, the percentage
of the population that is Asian and the unemployment rate now enter with signiﬁcantly negative signs
(regression 1b). The signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient for the unemployment rate is not unexpected
since payday borrowers must have a steady source of income.14 Also, the coefﬁcient on APR is positive
and signiﬁcant, while the coefﬁcient on APR-squared is now negative and signiﬁcant (regression 3b).
14 We  also estimated the Tobit model omitting ﬁve states, Connecticut, Maine, Montana, New Hampshire and Oregon, due to
the  low allowable interest rates which raises questions about whether payday lenders actually operate in these states despite
such  ﬁrms not being explicitly prohibited. Indeed, in three of these states there are no payday lenders, while in the other two
states  there only 8 and 12 in-state payday lenders (see Appendix 1). The empirical results are unchanged after re-estimating
the  Tobit model when omitting these ﬁve states.
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This suggests that the APR has a positive relationship to the concentration of payday lenders, but this
effect diminishes as the APR increases. Lastly, it should be emphasized that the Disasters variable and
the payday regulation index both enter with signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcients in the Tobit estimation
(regression 4b).
6. Conclusion
Overall, the empirical results indicate the following: (1) there is a signiﬁcantly positive relationship
between the concentration of payday lending stores and the percentage of the population that is
African American in all the regressions; (2) the percentage of the population that is Hispanic enters
our regressions with a signiﬁcantly negative sign; (3) the percentage of the population with a high
school degree or higher is signiﬁcantly negative in the regressions; (4) the poverty rate is always
signiﬁcantly positive; (5) the percentage of the population that is Asian enters with a signiﬁcantly
negative sign in the case of three of the four Tobit regressions; (6) the dummy variable for disaster-
prone areas is positive and signiﬁcant for both the OLS and Tobit regressions and; (7) the payday
regulation index enters with signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcients in both the OLS and Tobit regressions.
Most important, our empirical results are consistent with the view that payday lending stores are more
concentrated in those counties located in states whose regulatory regimes are more lenient, a new
ﬁnding that is unique to our study. Of course, much more work is needed to more fully understand the
causal mechanisms through which payday lenders impact individuals and, more broadly, the social
welfare implications of the payday lending industry.
Appendix 1. Legal status and number rate of payday lenders by state
State Legal status Data collected from regulators Payday lenders
based on
NAICSa codes
Number of
payday lenders
Number in
state
Number out of
state (on-line)
Alabama Legal 997 980 17 1035
Alaska Legal 25 19 6 9
Arizona Prohibit 0 0 0 436
Arkansas Prohibit 0 0 0 36
California Legal 2033 2010 23 2427
Colorado Legal 256 234 22 432
Connecticut Legal 0 0 0 82
Delaware Legal 347 123 224 126
District of
Columbia
Prohibit 0 0 0 29
Florida Legal 149 135 14 1520
Georgia Prohibit 0 0 0 1208
Hawaii Legal N/A N/A N/A 41
Idaho  Legal 51 25 26 212
Illinois  Legal 503 488 15 1248
Indiana Legal 41 31 10 520
Iowa  Legal 195 195 0 212
Kansas Legal 335 314 21 305
Kentucky Legal 550 550 0 648
Louisiana Legal 403 303 100 1342
Maine Legal 11 8 3 15
Maryland Prohibit 0 0 0 232
Massachusetts Prohibit 0 0 0 126
Michigan Legal 617 609 8 555
Minnesota Legal 81 74 7 132
Mississippi Legal 1013 998 15 1004
Missouri Legal 865 826 39 972
Montana Legal 0 0 0 57
Nebraska Legal 101 101 0 147
Nevada Legal 91 55 36 316
New  Hampshire Legal 0 0 0 15
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State Legal status Data collected from regulators Payday lenders
based on
NAICSa codes
Number of
payday lenders
Number in
state
Number out of
state (on-line)
New Jersey Prohibit 0 0 0 333
New Mexico Legal 148 140 8 435
New York Prohibit 0 0 0 685
North Carolina Prohibit 0 0 0 524
North Dakota Legal 47 41 6 22
Ohio Legal 737 735 2 950
Oklahoma Legal 338 323 15 977
Oregon Legal 66 12 54 151
Pennsylvania Legal N/A N/A N/A 219
Rhode Island Legal 52 49 3 53
South Carolina Legal 311 311 0 1348
South  Dakota Legal 408 227 181 110
Tennessee Legal 1283 1259 24 1370
Texas Legal 3889 3827 62 4623
Utah  Legal 81 47 34 320
Vermont Prohibit 0 0 0 4
Virginia Legal 225 225 0 577
Washington Legal 153 139 14 293
West Virginia Prohibit 0 0 0 23
Wisconsin Legal 330 321 9 536
Wyoming Legal 82 36 46 52
Total (excluding
N/As)
16,814 15,770 1044 29,044
a NAICS code refers to the North American Industry Classiﬁcation System.
Source:  Survey of state regulatory authorities and http://www.census.gov.
Appendix 2. Regulatory restrictions on payday lenders
State Legal
status
Maximum
loan
amount ($)
Minimum
loan term
(days)
Maximum
loan term
(Days)
Finance
charge for
14-day
$100 loan
($)
APR for
14-day
$100 loan
(%)
Max.
number of
outstand-
ing loans at
one time
Rollovers
or renewals
permitted
Alabama Legal 500 10 31 17.50 456.25 No limit 1
Alaska Legal 500 14 Not
speciﬁed
20.00 520.00 Not
speciﬁed
2
Arizona Prohibited N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Arkansas Prohibited N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
California Legal 300 0 31 17.50 456.25 1 0
Colorado Legal 500 180 N/A N/A N/A 2.5 1
Connecticut Legal 15,000
under
small loan
statute
N/A N/A 17.00 30.03 N/A N/A
Delaware Legal 1000 0 60 No limit No limit 5 4
District of
Columbia
Prohibited N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Florida Legal 500 7 31 16.11 419.00 1 0
Georgia Prohibited N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Hawaii Legal 600 0 32 17.65 459.00 1 0
Idaho Legal 1000 0 Not
speciﬁed
No limit No limit 5 3
Illinois Legal 1000 13 120 15.50 403.00 2 0
Indiana Legal 550 14 Not
speciﬁed
15.00 390.00 2 0
Iowa Legal 500 0 31 16.67 433.00 2 0
Kansas Legal 500 7 30 15.00 390.00 2 Not
speciﬁed
Kentucky Legal 500 14 60 17.65 459.00 2 0
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State Legal
status
Maximum
loan
amount ($)
Minimum
loan term
(days)
Maximum
loan term
(Days)
Finance
charge for
14-day
$100 loan
($)
APR for
14-day
$100 loan
(%)
Max.
number of
outstand-
ing loans at
one time
Rollovers
or renewals
permitted
Louisiana Legal 350 0 60 30.00 780.00 Not
speciﬁed
0
Maine Legal None Not
speciﬁed
Not
speciﬁed
20.96 43.00 Not
speciﬁed
Not
speciﬁed
Maryland Prohibited N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Massachusetts Prohibited 6000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Michigan Legal 600 7 31 15.00 390.00 2 0
Minnesota Legal 350 0 30 15.00 390.00 Not
speciﬁed
0
Mississippi Legal 500 0 30 20.00 520.00 Not
speciﬁed
0
Missouri Legal 500 14 31 75.00 1950.00 2.5 6
Montana Legal 300 0 31 1.39 36.00 1 0
Nebraska Legal 500 0 34 17.65 459.00 2 0
Nevada Legal 25% of
expected
monthly
gross
income
0 35 No limit No limit Not
speciﬁed
0
New
Hampshire
Legal 500 7 30 1.38 36.00 1 0
New Jersey Prohibited N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
New Mexico Legal 25% of
monthly
gross
income
14 35 16.00 417.00 2.5 0
New York Prohibited N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
North Carolina Prohibited N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
North Dakota Legal 500 0 60 20.00 520.00 3 1
Ohio Legal 500 31 Not
speciﬁed
15.00 390.00 1 0
Oklahoma Legal 500 12 45 15.00 390.00 1 0
Oregon Legal 50,000 31 60 15.00 36.00 1 2
Pennsylvania Legal 25,000 0 Not
speciﬁed
$9.50 per
$100 per
year
interest
plus $1.50
per $50
N/A Not
speciﬁed
Not
speciﬁed
Rhode Island Legal 500 13 Not
speciﬁed
10 260.00 3 1
South Carolina Legal 550 0 31 15.00 390.00 1 0
South Dakota Legal 500 Not
speciﬁed
Not
speciﬁed
Not
speciﬁed
Not
speciﬁed
2.5 4
Tennessee Legal 500 0 31 17.65 459.00 3 0
Texas Legal Not
speciﬁed
7 31 11.87 309.47 2.5 0
Utah Legal No limit 0 70 Not
speciﬁed
No limit Not
speciﬁed
5
Vermont Prohibited N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Virginia Legal 500 28 Not
speciﬁed
26.38 687.76 1 0
Washington Legal 700 0 45 15.00 390.00 3.5 0
West Virginia Prohibited N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Wisconsin Legal 1500 0 90 No limit No limit No limit 1
Wyoming Legal Not
speciﬁed
0 30 30.00 780.00 No limit 0
Source: Survey of state regulatory authorities, authors and Consumer Federation of America (payadayloaninfo.org).
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Appendix 3. Descriptive statistics for payday lenders and selected demographic and economic variables at county level
Legal states Prohibited states All states
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std.
deviation
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std.
Deviation
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std.
deviation
Number of
payday
lender stores
2531 0.00 734 6.32 26.37 545 0 0 0.00 0.00 3076 0 734 5.13 23.98
Number of
payday
lender stores
per 10,000
people
2531 0.00 7.35 0.74 1.04 545 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3076 0.00 7.35 0.60 0.99
%  White 2531 3.80 100.00 87.25 15.53 545 22.70 99.80 77.90 18.62 3076 3.80 100.00 85.59 16.51
%  Black or
African
American
2531 0.00 86.20 8.00 13.56 545 0.00 74.80 17.63 17.55 3076 0.00 86.20 9.70 14.81
%  Asian 2531 0.00 41.20 1.37 2.56 545 0.00 61.60 2.11 5.07 3076 0.00 61.60 1.50 3.16
%  Hispanic or
Latino origin
2531 0.00 98.30 8.86 14.24 545 0.00 82.70 6.27 7.87 3076 0.00 98.30 8.40 13.37
High  school
education (%)
2531 44.90 97.50 84.46 7.17 545 61.90 95.10 82.28 6.39 3076 44.90 97.50 84.07 7.09
Bachelor’s
education (%)
2531 3.70 72.80 19.38 8.46 545 5.60 59.50 19.83 10.14 3076 3.70 72.80 19.46 8.78
%  of population
under age 15
2531 0.00 34.80 19.24 3.13 545 0.00 27.00 18.83 2.75 3076 0.00 34.80 19.17 3.07
%  of population
over age 65
2531 3.80 44.50 16.18 4.40 545 4.00 33.20 15.23 3.74 3076 3.80 44.50 16.01 4.31
Unemployment
rate
2531  0.00 27.2 8.38 3.89 545 0.00 21.90 9.90 3.05 3076 0.00 27.20 8.65 3.80
Poverty  rate 2531 0.00 49.50 15.99 6.40 545 3.80 47.70 18.12 6.52 3076 0.00 49.50 16.37 6.47
Income per
capita
2531 9136 61,312 23,404 5235 545 8809 61,951 23,072 6804 3076 8809 61,951 23,346 5546
Note: This information is based on US Census Bureau Data for 2531 counties in the U.S.
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Appendix 4. Correlations among payday lenders and selected demographic and ﬁnancial characteristics at county level for states that do
not prohibit payday lenders
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
Payday loan stores per
10,000  people (1)
1
White  (2) −0.24 1
(0.00)
Black  or African American
(3)
0.32 −0.81 1
(0.00)  (0.00)
Asian  (4) −0.07 −0.22 0.02 1
(0.00)  (0.00) (0.32)
Hispanic  or Latino origin
(5)
−0.06 −0.07 −0.10 0.14 1
(0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age  under 15 (6) 0.12 −0.22 0.02 0.01 0.29 1
(0.00)  (0.00) (0.28) (0.64) (0.00)
Age  65-plus (7) −0.14 0.37 −0.21 −0.34 −0.21 −0.55 1
(0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
High  school degree or
higher  (8)
−0.28 0.33 −0.33 0.16 −0.42 −0.21 0.11 1
(0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Bachelor’s  degree or higher
(9)
−0.14 0.02 −0.07 0.49 −0.01 −0.10 −0.25 0.58 1
(0.00)  (0.44) (0.00) (0.00) (0.58) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Poverty  rate (10) 0.34 −0.48 0.41 −0.14 0.15 0.10 −0.11 −0.65 −0.38 1
(0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Unemployment  rate (11) 0.23 −0.47 0.41 0.00 −0.01 0.07 −0.19 −0.41 −0.27 0.60 1
(0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.81) (0.74) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income  per capita (12) −0.26 0.19 −0.22 0.42 −0.08 −0.14 −0.06 0.63 0.75 −0.72 −0.43 1
(0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Maximum  dollar loan
amount  (13)
−0.09 0.05 −0.09 0.03 0.17 −0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 1
(0.00)  (0.02) (0.00) (0.15) (0.00) (0.46) (0.19) (0.67) (0.06) (0.61) (0.04) (0.36)
Finance  charge for (14) 0.13 0.06 −0.09 −0.04 −0.16 0.12 −0.01 0.09 −0.02 −0.03 −0.04 −0.06 −0.06 1
(0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.64) (0.00) (0.25) (0.18) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
APR  for 14-day $100 loan
(15)
0.15 0.05 −0.07 −0.04 −0.16 0.13 −0.01 0.07 −0.03 −0.02 −0.05 −0.06 −0.13 0.99 1
(0.00)  (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.51) (0.00) (0.09) (0.27) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Maximum  number of loan
outstanding  (16)
0.11 0.00 0.07 −0.09 −0.05 0.13 −0.05 0.05 −0.01 0.00 −0.06 −0.02 −0.03 0.39 0.37 1
(0.00)  (0.83) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.73) (0.86) (0.00) (0.33) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00)
Maximum  number of
rollovers  (17)
0.10 0.14 −0.17 −0.04 −0.11 0.09 0.06 0.15 0.05 −0.09 −0.15 −0.01 0.07 0.55 0.53 0.09 1
(0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.56) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Disasters  (18) 0.12 0.01 0.08 −0.16 −0.11 0.02 0.05 −0.06 −0.10 0.03 −0.09 −0.08 −0.08 −0.06 −0.05 −0.05 0.06 1
(0.00)  (0.58) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.44) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00)
Metropolitan  areas (19) −0.06 −0.07 0.07 0.25 0.05 0.15 −0.32 0.15 0.30 −0.18 0.03 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.02 −0.07 0.00 1
(0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.97) (0.96) (0.95) (0.29) (0.00) (0.90)
Payday  regulation index
(20)
0.11 0.04 −0.08 −0.05 0.05 0.14 −0.04 0.04 0.01 −0.03 −0.09 −0.08 0.19 0.77 0.75 0.62 0.51 −0.14 −0.03 1
(0.00)  (0.05) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.52) (0.18) (0.00) (0.68) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10)
Note: p-Values are in parentheses.
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